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Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science.  The literature tends to 
understand it as a syndrome, and therefore has difficulty explaining variations in 
institutionalisation.  We suggest a new approach based on the transaction between a 
legislative party and its deputies, the failure of which is observable in party switching.  We 
identify three routes to institutionalisation by appealing to the vote-seeking, office-seeking 
or policy-seeking motivations of deputies.  Poland has had a large volume of party 
switching, along with wide variation in the incentives facing differently-motivated 
deputies.  Our survival analyses of switching in four Polish parliaments find that vote-
seeking is the most likely route to institutionalisation for Polish parties.  Moreover, we 
establish a concrete hypothesis for comparative testing: legislative parties can survive as 
long as their popular support exceeds forty per cent of their share in the previous election. 
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Institutionalising political parties has been one of the great challenges of the third wave of 
democratisation.   There is a clear consensus that institutionalised parties are important for a well-
functioning democracy (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 27-28; Reilly 2008: 3-4, 7-9).  
Unfortunately, institutionalisation remains a mysterious process.  Political scientists do well in 
separating institutionalised parties from uninstitutionalised parties, but have great problems in 
explaining why some institutionalise and others do not.  We take a new approach that focuses on 
the basic transaction of the legislative party: the exchange of deputies’ autonomy for the benefits 
of collective action.  The failure of this transaction is clearly observable in deputies’ decisions to 
switch legislative party.  The legislative party can take three roads to institutionalisation through a 
sequence of self-enforcement and self-reinforcement.  These three routes are associated with three 
types of parties: vote-seeking parties, office-seeking parties and policy-seeking parties.  We 
suggest a new way of tackling a major issue in political research, but draw our inspiration from 
well-established literatures. 
 
We have chosen Poland to test our approach, as it has experienced a huge variation in party 
switching over time and across parties.  Moreover, there has been wide variation in the incentives 
for vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking motivations to switch party.  The core of our 
empirical analysis consists of survival analyses of party switching in the four most recent Polish 
parliaments.  We find that the vote-seeking perspective is a far stronger explanation for switching 
than the office- or policy-based explanations.  According to our models, parties should be safe 
from mass switching if they retain over forty per cent of their support from the previous election.  
This figure establishes an interesting hypothesis for other country cases.  Indeed, the concepts and 
methods used in this research should travel very easily to other contexts. 
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The article is organised conventionally.  The next section discusses theory, explaining how and 
why we depart from the conventional ‘syndrome’ approach to party institutionalisation.  Then we 
explain why the Polish case is an apposite one for our purposes and introduce the measures and 
methods with which we test for the three routes to party institutionalisation.  After presenting the 
survival analysis, we discuss the prospects for the institutionalisation of Poland’s vote-seeking 
parties and consider implications for the comparative study of political parties.  A conclusion 
summarises and makes some suggestions for further research. 
 
Theory 
Huntington defines institutionalisation as ‘the process by which organizations acquire value and 
stability’ (1968: 12).  Randall applies this concept to political parties, defining party 
institutionalisation as comprising organisational systemness, embedded decisional autonomy, 
value infusion, a definite public image and presence and a relatively stable basis of support 
(Randall 2006; Randall & Svåsand 2002).  This definition has a lot in common with 
understandings of party system institutionalisation (Bértoa 2009; Gwiazda 2009: 352-355; 
Mainwaring 1999: 26-27; Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Sikk 2005; Krupavičius 2004; Markowski 
2001).  These multi-dimensional conceptions have been the subject of a huge amount of research, 
both implicit and explicit, and they undoubtedly point to some profound differences among 
political systems.  However, the multi-dimensional definitions constitute syndromes, rather than 
theoretical models.  As dependent variables they can separate institutionalised from 
uninstitutionalised systems.  They also identify some powerful vicious and virtuous circles.  The 
problem with syndromes is that the relationships between the variables are not sufficiently 
explicated.  Syndromes are not good at generating predictions or explaining variations in 
institutionalisation.  The literature has not provided concrete suggestions on how parties break in 
and out of vicious and virtuous circles.  One reason for these weaknesses may be the ambitious 
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generality of the literature, which tends to ignore the differences between types of political parties 
by holding them all to an abstract standard of institutionalisation.   
 
We take a more concrete approach that studies party institutionalisation in terms of clear causal 
mechanisms, rather than syndromes or circular processes.  Our focus is on the institution of the 
legislative party.  We measure institutionalisation by party switching or ‘any recorded change in 
party affiliation on the part of a politician … holding elective office’ (Mershon & Shvetsova 
2008: 104).  Obviously, a legislative party that cannot retain its deputies has not acquired ‘value 
and stability’.  Party switching has been rare in most established democracies (Heller & Mershon 
2009a: 4).  However, it is prevalent in many newer and non-Western democracies, such as Brazil, 
India and the Philippines.  Law- and constitution-makers in many of these countries seem to agree 
with political scientists who emphasise stable party systems, and have banned or sanctioned party 
switching (Janda 2009: 3-4; Reilly 2008: 15-16).   
 
Greif and Laitin (2004) follow game theorists in presenting institutions as transactions.  All 
legislative parties are sustained by the same basic transaction: deputies trade their autonomy for 
the benefits of collective action.  They also share the common institutional form of the legislative 
party.  Nonetheless, these institutions vary in their basic aims.  Strøm (1990) distinguishes among 
vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking parties.  Logically, these different types of parties 
have different ways of enforcing the institution of the legislative party.  Defectors from a vote-
seeking party cannot seek re-election on the party’s ticket.  Defectors from an office-seeking party 
will not be nominated to leadership positions in the executive or the legislature.  Defectors from a 
policy-seeking party will not be able to influence its policy position.  These enforcement 
mechanisms depend on parameters that are outside the direct control of the party (Greif & Laitin 
2004: 634).  The importance of a party’s nomination for the legislative election depends on its 
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level of popular support.  The benefits of office are not available to all parties and usually depend 
on a given party’s legislative strength and place in the policy space.  Policy influence also 
depends on legislative strength and place in the policy space, as well as the overall structure of 
public policy.  All other things being equal, a party seeking policies that are consistent with 
inherited policy structures is more likely to be successful than one seeking radical changes.  
While these are given parameters at a point in time, over time parties can influence them.  Thus, 
they are quasi-parameters (Greif & Laitin 2004: 639).  Parties are expected to compete for votes.  
Parties manoeuvre for control of government and legislative positions.  Similarly, they can and do 
change the policy space and the structure of public policy.  In this sense, the institution of the 
legislative party has three potential mechanisms of self-reinforcement.  This means the basic 
institutional transaction is compatible with a wider range of parameter values.  In other words, it 
has gained value to its deputies beyond the immediate exchange of autonomy for the benefits of 
collective action.  Vote-seeking parties with a record of delivering votes should suffer fewer 
defections.  Office-seeking parties that have in the past distributed the benefits of office to their 
deputies should have a lower switching rate.  Finally, parties that have achieved policy successes 
in the past will be surer of the loyalty of their deputies.  Thus, we identify three clear paths to 
legislative party institutionalisation.  By emphasising electoral, office and policy benefits to 
deputies in exchange for their loyalty parties ensure their own value and stability.  Clearly, these 
types are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, Strøm presents them as trade-offs and locates a given 
party in a three-dimensional space (Strøm 1990: 570-73).   
 
Strøm’s behavioural theory of political parties and Greif and Laitin’s theory of institutional 
change are both parsimonious and synthetic.  Strøm seeks to combine the deductive work on 
political competition in the Downsian tradition with the more inductive comparative literature on 
political parties (Strøm 1990: 568-70).  Similarly, Greif and Laitin bring together the deductive 
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work of game theorists and the more inductive approach of historical institutionalists (Greif & 
Laitin 2004: 634-6).  Our work does not add to the conceptual and theoretical profusion that 
hampers social science.  Instead, it seeks to address a major problem in the literature by building 
on some of the major strands in research developed over the last number of decades. 
 
There is a small but growing literature on party switching.  Although it rarely does so explicitly as 
we do, it operates very much within Strøm’s understanding of the three types of political parties 
(Heller & Mershon 2009b: 33; Heller & Mershon 2009c: 289; Kato & Yamamoto 2009: 260).  
Most explicitly test for vote-seeking behaviour.  Desposato (2006: 71) argues that some Brazilian 
switches are motivated by short-term electoral gain, while Mershon notes higher levels of 
switching in the lead-up to general elections, or around the time of second-order elections, which 
provide important information on the re-election chances of deputies (2009: 394).  Zielinski, 
Slomczynski and Shabad (2005) show how Polish deputies switched parties in order to escape 
electoral accountability for weak government performance in their constituency.  Reed and 
Scheiner’s work on Japan also emphasises ‘electoral incentives’ (2003: 473).  Similarly, the 
office-seeking party is often found in studies of legislative switching.  Desposato’s Brazilian 
‘pork’ is delivered through executive offices (2006: 70).  Mershon (2009: 394) identifies a 
benefits stage, during which government and legislative offices are allocated.  Finally, policy-
seeking is also identified as a motivation for legislative switching.  Mershon manages to isolate a 
control-of-policy stage (2009: 34), while Heller and Mershon argue that some Italian switching 
has been caused by the fuzzy party labels that provide little information on policy goals (2005: 
543).  Desposato’s model of Brazilian switching assumes parties wish to minimise ideological 
heterogeneity (2006: 71) and Reed and Scheiner explain the puzzle of the collapse of Japan’s 
Liberal Democratic Party by looking at the policy preferences of its deputies  (2003: 473).   
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The Polish case 
We study party switching in the lower, and much more powerful, house of the Polish parliament, 
the Sejm (Sanford 2002: 103-4).  The Polish case is an apposite test of routes to party 
institutionalisation because of the large volume of switching and the substantial variation in the 
independent variables.  There were major changes in support for parties in every term.  Therefore, 
there was intra-party and cross-party variation in potential for vote-seeking institutionalisation 
during every term.  There have been no grand coalitions, so there has always been the basic 
contrast between government and opposition.  Moreover, in all parliaments, except 1993-97, the 
party composition of the government changed during the term.  Therefore, there is scope to study 
variation in the incentives of parties seeking the most important offices.  Variations in the size, 
position in the ideological space and organisation of parties (Szczerbiak 2001; Strøm 1990: 593) 
are likely to have resulted in different levels of office- and policy seeking.   
 
Another advantage of the Polish case is that the changes in the overall institutional configuration 
are unlikely to have introduced bias into our conclusions.  We do not argue that post-communist 
Poland has been a paragon of constitutional stability.  Instead, we suggest that the rules directly 
impacting on legislative switching have not changed substantially.  Most relevantly, the key 
standing orders of the Sejm have not changed: they distinguish between caucuses (3-14 members) 
and groups (15 or more members) (Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1992: Art. 8).  Heller and 
Mershon (2005) capitalise on the two electoral systems used simultaneously in Italy.  There was 
no such profound internal variation in Poland.  The essence of the electoral system has remained a 
quasi-list system (Shugart: 2005), which gives voters some scope to modify the order of deputies 
on parties’ lists.  However, there is a big contrast between the proportionality of the electoral 
system in the first, 1991, election and later elections, which had thresholds of five per cent for 
parties and eight per cent for electoral coalitions.  Our analysis begins in 1993.  A less momentous 
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reform in 2001 increased the proportionality of the system, but was not associated with changes in 
fragmentation (Gwiazda 2009: 368).  The executive has been semi-presidential, with a dominant 
prime minister.  The ‘Little Constitution’ of 1992 introduced important changes in executive-
legislative relations, again before our study begins.  The 1997 Constitution introduced some 
reductions in the president’s powers (McMenamin 2008: 124), but these did not affect incentives 
for party switching.   At any rate, such incentives would operate through membership of a 
governing party, which we measure.  
 
Polish deputies have always been free to switch parties as they wish.  The leader of the populist 
Self-Defence party tried to eliminate switching by requiring all candidates to sign an agreement 
that would make them liable for a large amount of money on defection.  However, this was ruled 
illegal on several grounds, including unconstitutionality (Gazeta Wyborcza 2005).  It is doubtful 
whether there would be any public support for constraints on switching, as Poles hold very 
negative opinions on political parties.  Indeed, their opinions on, and participation in, parties are 
negative and low even when compared to other East-Central European countries and  other Polish 
institutions (Szczerbiak 2001: 195-199).  It is not clear to what extent public opinion disapproves 
of switching.  However, there is some evidence that defectors can evade accountability for the 
failures of governing parties (Zielinski et al. 2005). 
 
Research Design 
Studies of party switching vary in the precision of their observations.  Desposato (2006: 72) 
examines individual deputies’ decisions to switch across a large number of short time-periods.  
Zielinski, Slomczynski and Shabad (2005: 380) examine individual politicians also, but only from 
election to election and Heller and Mershon look at deputies at the beginning and end of a term 
(2005: 544-548).  Reed and Scheiner (2003) examine a small number of splitting episodes at the 
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individual level.  Mershon (2009: 401, 404) and Mershon and Shvetsova (2008: 110) report 
aggregate switching rates but in precisely defined time periods.  Finally, Shabad and Slomczynski 
(2004: 153-4) use aggregate data on switching rates, again observed only at election time.  These 
differences are summarised in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We analyse Polish switching at a high level of precision, as do Desposato and Heller and 
Mershon.  We study four terms intensively (with some data from a fifth), in contrast to 
Desposato’s two and Heller and Mershon’s one.  Our variables are intended to test the vote-, 
office- and policy-seeking routes to party institutionalisation and most of our measures are similar 
to those used in the literature discussed above.  The data and codebook are available at 
http://webpages.dcu.ie/~mcmenami. 
 
The Dependent Variable 
Our data include measurements on all deputies who served during the four terms since 1993.  
Their affiliations have been taken from the official record of the Sejm.  The data note the exact 
day of any switch.  Stable affiliations have been divided into fifteen day periods to facilitate the 
inclusion of opinion poll data.  The large number of observations essentially results from the 
multiplication of the number of fifteen-day periods by the number of deputies.  Some deputies 
were replaced in each term, particularly after elections to the European parliament in 2004.  The 
1991-93 parliament ended early, due to a presidential dissolution after a no-confidence vote in the 
government.  In 2007, the Sejm dissolved itself.   
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While switching is clearly a discrete phenomenon with important theoretical and substantive 
implications, it is also a heterogeneous category.  In a parliamentary regime, the direction of 
switching between government and opposition seems to be the most politically important 
(Mershon 2009).  In Italy, switching was concentrated within the opposition and within governing 
parties.  This has clearly not been the case in Poland.  The most common direction has been 
within the opposition, but the politically explosive category of government to opposition has been 
the second most frequent in Poland. (Table 2) A direction, which does not feature in the literature, 
but is important to our concern with institutionalisation, is from old to new parties.  In addition to 
overall switching rates, we will analyse switching in the two most frequent directions of within 
the opposition and from government to opposition, as well as from old to new parties. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Independent variables 
We employ a range of measures of vote-, office-, and policy-seeking motivations.  Poll is the 
party’s opinion poll score as a proportion of its popular vote at the last election.  All polls are 
from CBOS; the vast majority of these polls are monthly or more frequent.  There were two 
separate monthly interpolations in the 1997-2001 parliament. For the 1993-97 parliament, there 
were three separate monthly interpolations and the first seven months are an interpolation 
between the election result and the May 1995 poll.  For all data points, except May to August 
1996, the survey question asked only for which party respondents intended to vote.  For four 
months, the question also named the party leader.  For these months, the party-only question has 
been estimated from the relationship between party-only and party-and-leader formats in March 
and April 1996.  These data limitations probably contribute to the comparatively weak effect of 
the Poll variable in this term.   Polls did not measure support for the large number of micro-
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parties, never mind independents.  Such missing values have been coded zero, which does reflect 
the minimal chances of success for deputies who contest an election for a minor list.  We reran all 
our analyses of overall switching in the four terms, excluding all poll values of zero.  This made 
little difference to the performance of the Poll variable.  Also, we ran our models with lags of 
fifteen and thirty days.  The lagged versions did not perform nearly as well as the straightforward 
version, so we do not report them. 
 
Figures 1 to 4 report voting preferences for the largest parties in each term.  During the 1993-
1997, 1997-2001 and 2001-05 terms there were massive swings in popular support for the parties 
during the parliamentary term.  In the 1993-97 term, the left-wing SLD and centrist UD/UW went 
through troughs and over peaks, but their deputies never had to endure a long period during which 
many of them would have had to worry about re-election.   In contrast, the Polish Peasant Party 
ended the term with much lower support than they had won at the election.  Moreover, the right-
wing KPN and BBWR lost much of their electorate before the end of their separate existence half 
way through the term.  1997-2001 saw the spectacular obliteration of support for the election-
winning AWS right-wing bloc, with a comparably catastrophic fate for the centrist Freedom 
Union.  2001-05 exhibits a similar pattern, but this time it is the left-wing SLD that suffers a 
disastrous collapse in support.  The right-wing Law and Justice and centre-right Civic Platform 
both benefitted from a tripling of support.  In the 2005-07 parliament, preferences for the major 
parties represented a stalemate, but two smaller governing parties, Self-Defence and the League 
of Polish Families, found themselves below the electoral threshold of five per cent for much of 
the second year of the term.   
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[Please insert Figures 1 to 4 here] 
 
Our second variable is List.  Vote-seeking politicians who can expect a high list position in the 
next election should be less likely to switch.  List is a dummy variable that distinguishes between 
the first and lower places on a party’s electoral list.  In the 2001-05 parliament, 41 per cent of 
deputies had been placed first on an electoral list.  In the 2001 election, in constituency number 
one, the first placed candidates on the nine lists had a 0.66 probability of election, with those in 
second place scoring a probability of less than 0.03.  We have chosen the 2001-05 parliament 
because the European elections of 2004 occasioned the exit of many first-placed candidates and 
the entry of many lower-placed candidates, thereby maximising variation in list position.   
 
Next are the office-seeking variables.  Government indicates membership of a governing party.  
Office-seeking deputies are predicted to have a lower switching hazard when their party is in 
government.  Members records the number of members of the parliamentary party on the first day 
of the parliamentary term or on the day the party first appeared in official records.  This is a proxy 
for legislative power and the rewards it may bring to ambitious deputies.  The larger the caucus, 
the less likely office-seeking deputies are to switch.  An alternative version of this variable was to 
include dummies for the official categories of caucus and group from the Sejm’s standing orders.  
The raw count of members performed better in the following empirical models than these 
indicators.  Another measure of legislative office-seeking would have been membership of 
legislative committees.  Unfortunately, the Sejm only records these memberships at the beginning 
of each term, and since they change quite frequently, this would have been misleading.   
 
Finally, we employ several measures of policy-seeking.  Old Party is a proxy for the clarity of a 
party’s policy position.  In newer parties, policy positions will be fuzzier and policy-seeking 
politicians are more likely to switch.  In 2005, no new party surpassed the electoral threshold, but 
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new parties were formed within the parliament itself.  A similar logic underpins Experience.  
Deputies who have already served in the Sejm will be less likely to join a party that is 
incompatible with their policy preferences and should be less likely to switch.   
 
Right is a dummy variable, separating right-wing parties from others, as well as independents.  
The ideological vocabulary of Polish politics is unusual.  The left-right dimension is much more 
strongly defined by socio-cultural than by socio-economic issues (Markowski 2006: 817-18; 
Szawiel 1999).  The Polish right is relatively nationalist, religious and, especially, anti-
(post)communist (Szczerbiak 2002).  It is not necessarily committed to market economics.  
Indeed, Poland’s most famous trade union, Solidarity, is ‘right-wing’.  Similarly, the left, is more 
coherent on socio-cultural than on socio-economic matters.  However, its dominant 
representative, the post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left, has increasingly insisted that 
it is a typical European social democratic party.  Centrist parties are genealogically anti-
communist, but have downplayed the relevance of the historic cleavage to contemporary politics.  
They have also tended towards economic liberalism.   The right variable can also be interpreted as 
a proxy for ideological or policy heterogeneity.  The right’s ideology has not given its adherents 
very helpful cues in relation to the pressing matters of economic and social policy that faced 
Poland during all four terms studied here.  Moreover, the indivisible issues that define the right 
most closely pose difficulties for compromise.  Such issues repeatedly caused conflict with 
rightist parties that became notorious for the bitter personalisation of politics (Kitschelt et al. 
1999: 374).    Policy-seeking deputies should be more likely to switch from these diverse parties 
than from the generally more coherent left and centre.   
 
For the 1997-2001 and 2001-2005 parliaments, we are able to use a sharper variable to capture the 
incentives facing policy-seeking deputies.  Heterogeneity is the mean standard deviation of expert 
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responses to a series of eight questions on the policy positions of major parties contesting the 
2001 parliamentary elections (Benoit & Laver 2006: 123-152; Depauw & Martin 2009).  The 
higher the score, the more likely should policy-seeking deputies be to switch.  This variable is 
missing for 6.9 per cent of observations in 1997-2001 and a much more serious 23.3 per cent in 
2001-2005. 
 
Mershon’s approach to studying policy-seeking switches is to identify periods of heightened 
intensity of policy making in the legislature.  Comparing switching rates in this period to other 
periods during a parliament provides a test of the importance of policy-motivated switching.  We 
replicated Mershon’s method in all five parliaments since 1991.  In only one of the five 
parliaments did this approach provide any evidence of policy-seeking switches.  The appendix 
presents data by stage for all five parliaments, as well as contrasting data from Mershon and 
Shvetsova’s work on Italy and Russia.  Table 3 summarises the link between indicators and 
concepts. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Data analysis 
We conducted parametric survival analyses on switching for the four parliamentary terms since 
1993.  We tested exponential, Gompertz, Weibull, log normal, log-logistic and generalized 
gamma for goodness of fit according to the Akaike Information Criterion across the four types of 
switching and the four parliaments.  The Weibull model performed best by far.  Thus, we present 
our analyses in the form of Weibull regressions in the relative hazard metric.  Coefficients above 
one increase the hazard of switching, while coefficients below one reduce the hazard.  Our results 
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for overall switching are shown in Table 4.  This table employs only the variables that we have 
been able to measure for each of the post-1993 terms. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The Poll variable is the only consistent explanation for switching.  It is statistically significant in 
the predicted direction during all four terms.  It is strongest in 2005-07, next strongest in 1997-
2001, with the remaining two parliaments at similar levels.  Government reduced switching 
during the two left-wing governments of 1993-97 and 2001-05, but actually increased switching 
during the right-wing governments from 2005-07.  Membership of an Old Party reduced 
switching in 2001-05 and 2005-07.  In no term, were Experienced Deputies less likely to switch.  
Members of right-wing parties were much more likely to switch in 1993-97, but not in any of the 
later terms.  Indeed, they were less likely to switch in 2001-05 and 2005-07.  Members (the size of 
parliamentary parties) never reduced the likelihood of switching.   
 
This strong contrast between Poll and the other variables extends to different types of switching.  
For government to opposition switching, Poll was significant and in the right direction in 1997-
2001 and 2001-05.  The number of Members in the parliamentary party helped to explain 
defections from government to opposition in 2005-07.  In these equations, Old Party suffered 
from collinearity problems in all terms but 2005-07 and Experienced Deputy had to be dropped in 
2005-07.  Neither was ever significantly in the right direction.  It is unsurprising that no variable 
explained this type of switching from 1993-97, as only nine switches from government to 
opposition occurred.  Switching within the opposition was much more frequent.  Poll explains 
significant variation in these switches across all four terms, as does Right in 1993-97 and 1997-
2001.  Old Party and Experienced Deputy were significantly in the right direction in 2005-07 and 
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2001-05 respectively.  For switching from old to new parties, Poll is again consistently significant 
with the predicted sign.  Government and Experienced Deputy reduced this type of switching in 
1993-97, while Right increased it during the same term.  Members reduced switching from old to 
new parties in 2001-05.  These results are summarised in Table 5. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
For the 2001 to 2005 parliament, we were able to add a dummy for List position number one.  
This is a powerful predictor for overall switching, without seriously attenuating the impact of 
Poll.  This variable is not significantly associated with the other types of switching.  For the 1997-
2001 and 2001-2005 parliaments, we can use expert surveys to proxy the Heterogeneity of some 
parties.  For the former parliament, the variable has no effect.  However, for the latter, in which 
many observations of this variable are missing, it is a powerful predictor.  It does not substantially 
reduce the impact of the Poll variable. 
 
Vote-seeking drove the likelihood of a switch across all four terms and across different types of 
switching.  Office- and policy-seeking motivations were, at best, only intermittently important.  
Therefore, the Poll variable merits further exploration.  The first way of doing this is to contrast 
hazard rates for different levels of the variable.  Figures 6-9 show hazard rates for switching at the 
minimum and maximum values of Poll for each term, as well as 1 (no change in support since the 
election) and 0.5 (halving of support since the election).  If the hazard rate declines over time, the 
Weibull function tends to produce an extreme prediction for the very earliest period, as seen in the 
1997-2001 and 2005-07 parliaments.  This is especially true for low values of the Poll variable, 
and, of course, no Polish party lost large amounts of popular support in the few weeks between 
the election and the opening of parliament.  Indeed, that the Poll variable is important in 
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parliaments with quite different hazard functions is another indicator of the robustness of our 
conclusion regarding the importance of vote-seeking motivations for party switching. 
 
[Please insert Figures 5 to 8 here] 
 
 
In the 1993-97 parliament, the hazard rate was almost flat over time for popular parties.  For less 
popular parties, with a higher likelihood of switching, there was a modest increase in the hazard 
over time.  The hazard rate of parties that suffered a halving of popular support is over twice that 
of parties that maintained support relative to the general election.  There is an even greater 
contrast between parties that halved their support and the hazard rate for the minimum Poll score 
of only 0.17.  The 1997-2001 parliament exhibits a different relationship between Poll values and 
switching.  The overall hazard rate is much higher and has a different shape, with the hazard 
initially falling quickly after the beginning of the term and falling much more slowly thereafter.  
Except for the very early days, there is little difference between parties that have maintained or 
increased support and those which have seen their support halved.  The real contrast is between 
the minimum value, a paltry 0.06, and the others.  In 2001-05, the hazard rate was between that of 
the 1993-97 and 1997-2001 parliaments.  The hazard is relatively flat for parties with stable 
popularity, but increases markedly over time for parties that are losing popular support.  Unlike 
the previous two terms, there are big differences between the hazard rates right across the range of 
poll values.  The hazard function of the 2005-07 parliament is reminiscent of 1997-2001.  The 
hazard rate declines quickly and is only substantively affected by the Poll variable at very low 
values, which suggest the virtual obliteration of the party.   
 
The models of the 1997-2001 and 2005-07 terms have dramatic implications.  As the simulations 
in Figures 10 and 12 suggest, had there not been really drastic collapses in the popularity of some 
parties, there would have been virtually no switching in either parliament.  In the 1993-97 and 
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2001-05 parliaments, as illustrated in Figures 9 and 11, the effect of the Poll value is more 
gradual and extends further across the range.  However, the substantive implications are quite 
different because of the contrast between the huge numbers of switchers in 2001-05 and the small 
number switching in 1993-97.  For 2001-05, the model predicts a reduction of sixty seven in the 
number of deputies switching by the end of term, as the poll value moves from its actual 
minimum of 0.11 to a relatively stable 0.8.  In 1993-97, a move from the real minimum of 0.17 to 
0.8 is predicted to result in twenty three fewer switchers.   
 
[Please insert Figures 9 to 12 here] 
 
 
 
The institutionalisation parameter 
In this section, we consider the progress of, and prospects for, legislative party institutionalisation 
in Poland, and its implications for comparative politics more generally.  In doing so, we begin 
with Greif and Laitin’s emphasis on parameters, or the conditions under which an institution can 
achieve self-enforcement.  Then, we go on to analyse quasi-parameters.  A quasi-parameter, like a 
parameter, sets the bounds of institutional self-enforcement.  However, its values can be 
influenced by the process of institutional self-enforcement.  If an institution can widen the 
parameter values under which it is able to enforce its basic transaction, then it can be described as 
a self-reinforcing institution. 
 
Our results show that a legislative party in Poland is most likely to institutionalise if it convinces 
its members that it can deliver votes.  Our simulations can provide figures for the parameter that 
governs the ability to the legislative party to enforce itself as an institution for its deputies.  Ten 
per cent of deputies switching during a term is a reasonable maximum for an institutionalised set 
of legislative parties.  Indeed, Heller and Mershon report figures of over ten per cent in systems 
that either have a reputation for underinstitutionalised parties, or were undergoing systemic 
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change (Heller and Mershon 2009a: 11-13).  Using this figure, our models estimate a popular 
support parameter of 0.4 or less for all parliaments except for 2001-5, for which the parameter is 
over one.  In three out of four parliaments, Polish deputies did not switch until their parties had 
endured massive losses in popular support.  Polish politicians are electorally sensitive, not hyper-
sensitive.  Across the four parliaments since 1993, the mean minimum for our poll variable has 
been 0.1 – literally decimation!  By comparison, take Canada, which in the 1990s exhibited 
unusual party system instability for an established democracy.  The Progressive Conservatives 
who were, for one parliament, reduced to two deputies, and took a number of parliaments to 
recover, scored a minimum of 0.26 on the poll  measure in the 1988 to 1993 parliament, and, over 
0.4 in the next two parliaments.  Ireland is currently undergoing one of Europe’s most dramatic 
economic crises.  In 2009 it reported the largest budget deficit in the European Union, greater 
even than that of stricken Greece. The main governing party, Fianna Fáil, has not scored less than 
0.41 of its last general election result.  These examples suggest that the rarity of party switching in 
most established democracies is not because they have a lower parameter of public support than 
Poland’s younger democracy, but rather that levels of public support never fall outside the 
parameter values that underpin the basic transaction of the institution of the legislative party.  
However, the model of the 2001-05 parliament implies a completely different situation, in which 
deputies panic and switch as soon as their party begins to lose popular support.  If the parameter 
value of public support across parliaments were greater than one, then institutionalisation would 
be highly unlikely, as all parties cannot continue in popularity. 
 
If a party can reduce the parameter value under which it can enforce itself, it can be described as 
self-reinforcing.  Parties that can prevent legislative switching for one term should be less 
vulnerable to the popular support parameter thereafter.  Under this self-reinforcement mechanism, 
parties that achieve re-election to the parliament should be more likely to retain support than new 
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parties.  The most obvious indicator of this mechanism is volatility.  There has been no clear 
decline, or even trend, in the Pedersen volatility index (1979), or in Bartolini and Mair’s bloc 
volatility (2007), over the five elections (Gwiazda 2009: 358).  Powell and Tucker have recently 
decomposed volatility into two types, which are particularly relevant for our purposes.  Type A is 
volatility resulting from party entry and exit, while Type B is volatility amongst stable parties.  
Again, there is no trend, even in Type B, which reduces confusion from phenomena such as party 
switching (Powell & Tucker 2008: 33).  Of course, neither has there been a widening in the public 
support parameter, which would indicate that it might be a quasi-parameter.  Therefore, we detect 
a robust enforcement mechanism in vote-seeking legislative parties, but these parties have not 
managed to adapt this mechanism to self-reinforcement.  The vote-seeking legislative party 
appears to be a potential route of institutionalisation, but one that has not yet been successful. 
 
The institutionalisation of Polish parties has been the subject of debate amongst country 
specialists.  A few years ago, Szczerbiak (2007) and Markowski (2006) both expressed scepticism 
about the prospects for institutionalisation in the near future, but, more recently, Gwiazda (2009) 
has argued that the Polish party system is undergoing institutionalisation.  The theory and data 
presented in this article suggests that all analysts should be careful not to overemphasise office-
based variables, such as the possible first re-election of a Polish government, or policy-based 
variables, such as the relatively narrow terms of debate in the 2010 presidential election.  Instead, 
we advise a focus on measures that matter to vote-seeking parties.  The popular support of the 
principal parties in the 2007-2011 parliament has so far been stable (Centrum Badania Opinii 
Społecznej 2010) and switching has been minimal.  Threats to the ongoing self-enforcement of 
the legislative parties could come from a change in the parameter threshold for switching or from 
a sharp decline in popular support.  Given that in only one parliament has the threshold crossed 
0.4, this first scenario seems unlikely.  However, catastrophic falls in popular support have been 
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routine in Polish politics, so this is much more probable.  One obvious cause of a sudden massive 
loss of popularity is a corruption scandal (Manys 2009), but the largest party in the current 
parliament, seems to have ridden out one such crisis relatively unscathed (Manys 2010).  If, as 
seems likely, the same parties are elected in similar strengths, there would be a fall in volatility 
and an indication that Polish parties have achieved a measure of self-reinforcement.  It might be 
that Polish parties will finally move along the vote-seeking route from self-enforcement to self-
reinforcement, and will thereby institutionalise.   
 
Conclusions 
Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science.  The existing literature tends to 
present institutionalisation as a syndrome rather than a causal model.  Such syndromes offer us 
the opportunity to document variation but not to explain it.  Moreover, the extant research on 
institutionalisation seems to underplay, or even ignore, differences between types of parties.  We 
take an approach to party institutionalisation that is both concrete and flexible.  It is concrete 
because we identify specific and measurable basic transactions of the legislative party, and its 
self-enforcement and self-reinforcement.  It is flexible because we identify three routes to 
institutionalisation: vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking.  In doing so, we are inspired 
by major literatures that have already proven their worth to political scientists.   
 
We think our study of Poland demonstrates the potential of this approach to party 
institutionalisation.  The volume of party switching and the variation in vote-, office- and policy-
seeking incentives make Poland an apposite test case.  We show that legislative party switching, 
which undermines the institutionalisation of legislative parties, is powerfully and consistently 
driven by vote-seeking.  In contrast, office- and policy-seeking perspectives on legislative party 
switching in Poland are, at most, intermittently plausible.  Polish deputies switch in order to 
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secure their political survival, not out of short-term ambition for higher office or because of a 
chaotic and polarised policy space.  Our empirical technique allows us to provide a quantitative 
estimate of a vital parameter of party institutionalisation – public support.  In Poland, legislative 
parties can enforce basic discipline and survive if their public support exceeds forty per cent of 
their vote at the previous parliamentary election.  This, rather than the office- or policy-seeking 
channels, seems the most likely route for the institutionalisation of Polish parties.   
 
This result has an important implication for comparative politics.  All the measures used here 
should be easily replicable in other parliaments, with the exception of the ideological coding of 
right-wing parties.  Moreover, the parameter value establishes an interesting hypothesis.  Does 
party switching in other contexts have the same popular support threshold of forty per cent of the 
previous election result?  If so, it is the instability of popular opinion, rather than manoeuvring 
over governments and battles over policy, that threatens party institutionalisation.  Conversely, 
parties that want to institutionalise need to reassure their deputies that voters will be retained, 
rather than delivering the spoils of office or public policy goods.   
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Table 1. Classification of quantitative studies of switching 
 
Time-period observations 
Many Few 
Observation of 
deputies 
Individual 
Desposato (2006), Heller 
and Mershon (2005) 
Zielinski, Slomczynski 
and Shabad (2005), Reed 
and Scheiner (2003) 
Aggregate 
Mershon and Shvetsova 
(2008), Mershon (2009) 
Shabad & Slomczynski 
(2004) 
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Table 2. The direction of Polish and Italian switching 
  1991-93 1993-97 1997-01 2001-05 2005-07 
Italy 1996-
01 
Govt. to 
Oppo. 
1.16 .04 .31 .25 .26 0 
Oppo. to 
Govt. 
.19 .004 .005 .16 .004 0.026 
Among 
Oppo. 
1.06 .75 .33 1.74 .53 0.302 
Among 
Govt. 
0 .004 0 .027 0.023 0.407 
Note: Cell entries are mean monthly switches per 100 deputies.  Italian data from 
Mershon 2009: 404. 
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Table 3: Summary of Indicators 
Institution 
(transaction) 
Shared 
institutional 
elements 
Differing institutional 
elements 
Self-
enforcement 
Observable Implication 
Quasi-
parameter 
Self-reinforcement 
Observable 
Implication 
Party  
(autonomy for 
benefits of 
collective action) 
Legislative 
party 
Aim of party is to 
maximise votes 
Defectors 
cannot run on 
the party’s 
ticket. 
Less likely to switch from 
popular parties. 
More likely to switch if in 
lower list position. 
Popular 
support 
Parties that gain re-
election are more 
likely to retain 
popular support 
than new parties. 
Decreasing 
volatility. 
Aim of party is to 
control max. no. of 
ministries, committee 
chairs, etc. 
Defectors 
cannot be 
ministers or 
committee 
chairs. 
Less likely to switch from 
governing parties, large 
parties.  More likely to 
switch during benefits 
stage. 
Bargaining 
power  
Governments gain 
popular support and 
change the policy 
space to their own 
advantage. 
Return of 
governing 
parties.  
Aim of party is to 
influence policy 
Defectors 
reduce the 
party’s ability 
to influence 
policy. 
More likely to switch from 
new parties.   
Experienced deputies less 
likely to switch. 
More likely to switch from 
heterogeneous party. 
More likely to switch 
during policy stage 
Public policy 
Past policy 
influence changes 
the policy space 
and structure of 
public policy to 
make future policy 
influence more 
likely. 
Parties with 
past policy 
successes are 
more 
influential. 
 
Note: Table adapted from Greif and Laitin 2004: 641. 
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Table 4. Explanations of Switching: Weibull regression in proportional hazard form 
 1993-97 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2007 
Poll 
.13012 
(.04307)*** 
.01185 
(.00617)*** 
.1613 
(.02328)*** 
.00239 
(.00247)*** 
Government 
.13194 
(.08936)** 
1.1784 
(.85693) 
.0707 
(.0236)*** 
15.053 
(6.5781)*** 
Old Party 
.68696 
(.18418) 
2.0004 
(1.1078) 
.2928 
(.0442)*** 
.10846 
(.04794)*** 
Experienced 
Deputy 
.77065 
(.1324) 
1.2677 
(.24645) 
.9772 
(.0956) 
1.0307 
(.2129) 
Right 
3.3709 
(.5995)*** 
1.26 
(.34387) 
.1858 
(.0405)*** 
.0916 
(.04638)*** 
Members 
1.0017 
(.00578) 
.99835 
(.00515) 
1.008 
(.0023)*** 
1.0287 
(.00725)*** 
Shape parameter 
(p) 
1.083 
(.12601) 
.6783 
(.10172) 
1.408 
(.07602) 
.7481 
(.09727) 
Log Likelihood -149.257 -285.412 -306.838 -160.243 
LR chi2(6) 550.06*** 239.92*** 785.44*** 399.38*** 
Observations 45280 45627 46420 23060 
Note: *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
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Table 5. Summary of models explaining different types of switching across four 
parliamentary terms 
 
Government to 
Opposition 
Within 
Opposition 
From Old to 
New 
Poll 2/4 4/4 4/4 
Government NA NA 1/4 
Old Party 0/1 1/4 NA 
Experienced Deputy 0/3 1/4 1/4 
Right - 2/4 1/4 
Members 1/4 0/4 1/4 
Notes: The denominator is the number of terms for which the variable is included.  The numerator 
is the number of terms for which the variable was statistically significant and in the predicted 
direction.  The denominator for Government to Opposition varies since some variables had to be 
dropped because of collinearity.  Right was collinear in all four terms.   
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Figure 1. Voting preferences 1993-97 
Note: SLD= Alliance for the Democratic Left; PSL= Polish Peasant Party; UD / UW= Democratic Union / Freedom 
Union; BBWR= Non-party Bloc for the Support of the Reforms; KPN= Confederation for an Independent Poland 
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Figure 2. Voting preferences 1997-2001 
Note: AWS= Solidarity Electoral Action; SLD= Alliance for the Democratic Left; PSL= Polish Peasant Party; UW= 
Freedom Union 
. 
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Figure 3. Voting preferences 2001-2005 
Note: SLD= Alliance for the Democratic Left; PSL= Polish Peasant Party; PO= Civic Platform; PiS= Law and 
Justice; Samoobrona= Self-Defence 
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Figure 4. Voting preferences 2005-2007 
Note: PiS=Law and Justice; PO= Civic Platform; Samoobrona= Self-Defence; LPR= League of Polish Families. 
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Figure 5.  Hazard function for switching: 1993-1997 
Note: Hazard function at different levels of the poll variable derived from model in Table 4. 
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Figure 6.  Hazard function for switching: 1997-2001 
Note: Hazard function at different levels of the poll variable derived from model in Table 4. 
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Figure 7.  Hazard function for switching: 2001-2005 
Note: Hazard function at different levels of the poll variable derived from model in Table 4. 
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Figure 8.  Hazard function for switching: 2005-2007 
Note: Hazard function at different levels of the poll variable derived from model in Table 4. 
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Figure 9. Simulations of the effects of minimum poll values on switching: 1993-1997 
Note: Figures derived from separate simulations based on Model in Table 4.  Each bar represents the number of 
deputies predicted to have switched parties by the end of the term according to different minimum values of the poll 
variable. 
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Figure 10. Simulations of the effects of minimum poll values on switching: 1997-2001 
Note: Figures derived from separate simulations based on Model in Table 4.  Each bar represents the number of 
deputies predicted to have switched parties by the end of the term according to different minimum values of the poll 
variable. 
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Figure 11. Simulations of the effects of minimum poll values on switching: 2001-2005 
Note: Figures derived from separate simulations based on Model in Table 4.  Each bar represents the number of 
deputies predicted to have switched parties by the end of the term according to different minimum values of the poll 
variable. 
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Figure 12. Simulations of the effects of minimum poll values on switching: 2005-2007 
Note: Figures derived from separate simulations based on Model in Table 4.  Each bar represents the number of 
deputies predicted to have switched parties by the end of the term according to different minimum values of the poll 
variable. 
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Appendix: Replication of Stages Approach 
 
 1991-93 1993-97 1997-2001 2001-05 2005-07 Italy Russia 
 Wks. Sw. Wks. Sw. Wks. Sw. Wks. Sw. Wks. Sw. Wks. Sw. Wks. Sw. 
Affiliation - - - - - - - - - - 4 0.36 6 5.56 
Office 8 0.68 3 .07 1 0 8 0.49 3 0 9 0.35 12 0.3 
Policy 18 0.27 47 0.22 62 0.11 54 0.21 38 0.23 109 0.2 26 1.09 
Dormant 53 0.53 118 0.23 101 0.18 115 0.46 60 0.16 95 0.1 53 0.14 
Electoral - - 48 0.05 46 0.13 46 0.94 22 0.45 94 0.21 8 0.42 
Note: Total switches per week per 100 MPs.  Italian and Russian data from Mershon and Shvetsova 2008: 110
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